At Israel har et spionnettverk er ingen nyhet. I forkant av 11. September ble bla. et Israelsk nettverk rullet opp i USA. Det litt spesielle er at reaksjonen på dette ikke ble massiv fengsling og isfront mellom USA, men heller "et ubrytelig bånd".
Som dokumentert i artikkelen "Topphemmelig jødisk-amerikansk overvåknings-skandale avslørt" er det sentrale personer av jødisk herkomst i så og si samtlige involverte konsernene som bla. facebook, google, og Microsoft. Som de fleste er klar over inneholder en religion både åndelighet og politikk, og jødedom er inted unntak.
Kan det derfor tenkes at disse jødene har et felles politisk motiv med overvåkingen med det formål å tjene Israelske interesser?
HW.no skriver:
-Sitat start-
Nye opplysninger om NSAs svært omfattende
overvåkningsprosjekt har nærmest blitt rutinemessige, og nå har den britiske
avisen The Guardian offentligjort atter ny informasjon fra Edward Snowden som
ikke var ment for allmennhetens øyne.
Denne gangen kan avisen melde at NSA på jevnlig basis deler
innhentede etterretningsopplysninger med sin nære allierte i Midt-Østen,
Israel.
Mottar rådata uten forpliktelser
Delingen skal foregå på grunnlag av en formell avtale som
ble inngått i 2009 mellom NSA og tilsvarende byråer i Israel, og skal ikke inneholde noen juridiske begrensninger på hvordan informasjonen blir brukt
av Israel.
I tillegg skal det være snakk om rådata, det vil si
etterretningsinformasjonen som ikke blir undersøkt og evaluert på forhånd av
NSA for å luke ut informasjon som omhandler amerikanske statsborgere.
Dermed kan det se ut til at avtalen setter personvernet til
amerikanerne i alvorlig fare, samt er stikk i strid med tidligere forsikringer
fra Barack Obama om at NSA bruker sikkerhetsmekanismer som ivaretar
personvernet.
Erkjenner delingen
I avtaledokumentet står det visstnok flere steder at
materialet skal håndteres i tråd med amerikansk lovgivning og at israelerne har
gått med på å ikke bruke noe av informasjonen til å forfølge amerikanere, men
det skal altså ikke finnes noen juridiske og formelle forpliktelser.
En NSA-representant som The Guardian har vært i kontakt med
benktet ikke at en slik deling foregår, men bedyret at alt skjer i henhold til
gjeldende lover. Byrået ville imidlertid ikke kommentere saken ytterligere.
-Sitat slutt-
Dokumentets innhold
l\J UDI1,
MEMORANDUM
OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) BETWEEN THE NATIONAL
SECURITY SECURITY SERVICE AND THE ISRAELI
SIGINT NATIONAL UNIT (ISNU) PERTAINING
TO THE PROTECTION OF U.S. PERSONS
I. (U)
PURPOSE
3.
This
agreement between NSA and The Israeli SIGINT National Unit (ISNU) prescribes procedures
and responsibilities for ensuring that ISNU handling of materials provided by
NSA -- including, but not limited
to. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) technology and equipment and raw SIGINT data
signals intelligence
information that has not been reviewed for foreign intelligence purposes or
minimized) -- is consistent
with the requirements placed upon NSA by U.S. law and Executive Order to
establish safeguards protecting
the rights of U.S. persons under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
This
agreement will apply to any SIGINT raw traffic, technology, or enabling that
NSA may provide to
ISNU. This agreement applies only to materials provided by NSA and shall not be
construed to apply to
materials collected independently by ISNU.
ISNU also
recognizes that NSA has agreements with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom that require it to protect information associated with UK. persons,
Australian persons, Canadian
persons and New Zealand persons using procedures and safeguards similar to
those applied for U.S. persons.
For this reason, in all uses of raw material provided by NSA, ISNU agrees to
apply the procedures outlined in
this agreement to persons of these countries.
(U) This
agreement is not intended to create any legally enforceable rights and shall
not be construed to be either an
intemational agreement or a legally binding instrument according to
intemational law.
. (U)
DEFINITIONS
REL) Raw
SIGINT is any SIGINT acquired either as a result of search and development, or targeted collection
operations against a particular foreign intelligence target before the
information has been evaluated for foreign
intelligence and minimized. Raw SIGINT includes, but is not limited to,
unevaluated and unminimized
transcripts, gists. facsimiles, telex, voice and Digital Network Intelligence
(DNI) metadata and content.
Minimization
is the process used to determine whether U.S. person information encountered in raw SIGINT
is essential to assess or understand the significance of the foreign intelligence.
The NSA Special US Liaison
Advisor Israel (SUSLAIS) should be consulted any time U.S. person information
is found in raw SIGINT data
supplied by NSA.
(U) A U.S.
Person is:
l) (U) a
citizen of the United States;
2) (U) an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States
(informally referred to as a "green
card" holder);
TOP TO USA,
ISR DEK IKJ
(U) an
unincorporated group or association. a substantial number of the members of
which constitute (1) or (2)
above: or
4) (U) a
company incorporated within the United States, including U.S.--flagged
non-governmental aircraft or vessels.
but not including those entities which are openly acknowledged by a foreign
government or to be
directed and controlled by them.
5) (U)
Additionally, a person known to be currently in the United States will be
treated as a person" unless that
person is reasonably identified as an alien who has not been admitted for
permanent residence.
or if the nature of the person's communications or other information in the
contents or circumstances
of such communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is not
a U.S. person. Any
person located outside the United States will be treated a non-U.S. person unless there is a
reasonable belief that such person is a U.S. person.
(U)
BACKGROUND
a. NSA
routinely sends ISNU minimized and unminimized raw collection associated with selectors
from multiple Target Office Primary Interest (TOPI) offices in Analysis and
Production, S2 as part of the SIGINT
relationship between the two organizations. This mutually agreed upon exchange
has been beneficial
to both NSA's and mission and intelligence requirements.
b. NSA and
ISNU have previously discussed the protection of U.S. Person information, in
relation to tasking
joint collection operations. and agreed in principle to not task communications
of U.S. citizens. The proposal to
share unminimized raw collection requires additional procedures to meet formal
requirements.
In March
2009. ISNU was given an overview briefing during the Raw Material conference
and agreed. in principal
to protect U.S. Person information. It was determined that more formalized
training is needed. The date of
this training is TBD.
IV. (U)
RESPONSIBILITIES
a. (U) NSA
shall:
1) Provide
an annual review and training of these procedures with ISNU.
2)
Regularly review a sample of files transferred to ISNU to validate the absence
of U.S.
Persons
identities.
b. (U) ISNU
shall:
1) Not use
any technology or equipment that is furnished under the accommodation procurement
process to intentionally target communications to, from, or about U.S. Persons anywhere in
the world or intentionally target any person meeting the definition ofa U.S.
Person provided in
Section II above.
Not use any
infonnation provided by NSA. as raw material or otherwise, to intentionally
intercept
the communications to, from or about a LI .S. person. "lntercept"
means the use of words or phrases.
such as a name, tclex number or answerback. address. telephone number, email
address or any combination
of such terms, to acquire non--public communications. It applies to both
electronic and manual
acquisition, including follow-on queries of stored communications.
Strictly
limit access to storage Systems containing raw SIGINT provided by NSA exclusively
to properly cleared ISNU personnel and to properly cleared members of Israeli
lntelligence services
who ISNU has determined have a strict need to know. Access will be limited to
those individuals
who have been trained in the aforementioned procedures.
Disseminate
foreign intelligence information concerning U.S. persons derived from raw SIGINT
provided by NSA -- to include any release outside ISNU in the form of reports,
transcripts. gists.
memoranda, or any other fomi of written or oral document or transmission only
in a manner that does
not identify the U.S. person. ISNU agrees that it will shield the identities of
persons both by name and
by context. i.e. its disseminations shall be in such a way that a reasonably person
cannot identify the .S. person from the other contents of the dissemination.
Ensure that
any files containing the identities of US. persons withheld from dissemination
are
retained for no more than one year.
Ensure that
any requests from outside parties, including all ISNU customers, for release ofsuch
identities are referred to NSA. and that same is not released without written
permission from NSA.
(U Destroy
upon recognition any communication contained in raw SIGINT provided by NSA that is
either to or from an official of the U.S. Government. Government
officials" include officials
of the Executive Branch (including the White House, Cabinet Departments. and
independent agencies);
the House of Representatives and Senate (members and staff); and the U.S.
Federal Court
system (including, but not limited to. the Supreme Court).
"Officials" include civilian and military
members and employees performing the official business of these branches of
govemment, and is
independent of seniority or position.
Process
only for purposes unrelated to intelligence against the U.S any communications contained
in raw SIGINT provided by NSA that include references to activities. policies,
and views of U.S.
officials.
v. (U)
PROCEDURES
3.
ISNU must
inform NSA iiriinediately upon detection, via the SUSLAIS. when the identity
ofa
US. person
is found in the raw SIGINT provided to ISNU. Additionally, ISNU must provide a
written report. via the
SUSLAIS and CHIPPEWA on a quarterly basis. detailing the circumstances ofthose
instances.
ISNU must
inform NSA immediately upon via the SUSLAIS. ofinadvertent intercept
of U.S. person communications where a selector that is believed to belong to a
valid foreign target is
subsequently
found to belong to a US. person. ISNU further agrees to detask any and all such
selectors. and to destroy any
intercept collected as a result of such selectors. whether processed or not.
vi. (U)
OVERSIGHT
2:1.
ISNU agrees
to put in place appropriate management controls to ensure adherence to the
above
policies.
and to provide NSA with an annual report describing these controls and
enumerating any and all violations
of the above policies regarding access. collection, and dissemination. This
report will be filed with the
SUSLAIS. who will send it to NSA HQS Office General and ISNU Oversight and
Compliance.
NSA agrees
to assist with the implementation of appropriate management controls. NSA will also
provide an annual review and training ofthese procedures to ISNU.
VII. (U)
AND AMENDMENTS
(U) This
MOU is effective immediately upon execution and shall remain valid until
modified or rescinded by mutual
agreement. It may be terminated unilaterally upon written notice by either
party to the other.
(U) The
terms and conditions of this MOU shall be reviewed at least every two years or
upon request by any of the
parties.
Amendments
to this MOU will be in writing, mutually agreed to by both Parties. and
executed
by
authorized delegates for the Israeli and US. Government. A copy of all
amendments will be appended to each copy
ofthis document. dated, and consecutively numbered.
(U) Any
disputes or disagreements with regard to the interpretation of this MOU will be
resolved through discussion
by all parties. The parties agree that they will not attempt to enforce the
terms of the MOLZ in any domestic.
third party. or international court or tribunal.
(U)
LANGUAGE
This
agreement is executed in the English language.
IX. (U)
FUNDING
(U) Except
as provided herein, this agreement does not sanction the transfer or exchange
of appropriated funds or
authorized manpower between the parties.
(U) No
appropriated funds are obligated by this agreement. Funding is subject to
availability of appropriated funds. and
must comply with the Anti-Deficiency Act, 21 1341 and l5l7.
X. (U)
POINTS OF CONTACT
Z1.
The NSA HQS
point of contact for this MOU is the Country Desk Officer (CDO) for Israel,
Foreign
Affairs Directorate.
The NSA
representative to Israel is the Special US. Special Liaison Advisor Israel
The ISNU
point of contact is the Head of ISNU Foreign Relations.
XI. (U)
SIGNATURES
For the
Israeli SIGINT National Unit (ISNU)
TOP T(i) USA. ISR
l\ll
.'l\l\ll l\ll l\7\
Si gnuture:
Title: ('ommundeiz Israel" . '.1tit>nz11 Unit
Date
ot'Signz1tui'e;
For the
Government of the linited States of America
National
Security Security Service
Signature:
Title:
Director. Nutiunul Security
Date
ot'Signature:
RH H)
Ingen kommentarer:
Legg inn en kommentar